One of the traits he identifies is America as the reluctant warrior. The chapter in which he discusses this is superb. He begins by recalling Rick Blaine, as played by Humphrey Bogart in the incomparable Casablanca. Blaine, Matthews tells us, is like the coiled rattlesnake in one of America's earliest symbols, one adopted by the country's Revolutionary War soldiers and commended by Benjamin Franklin. That snake was always accompanied by the motto, "Don't tread on me."
Americans, Matthews asserts, have never looked for a fight. Rick Blaine was trying to avoid involvement in the Second World War. But once the fight came his way, he was in it to win.
The motif of the reluctant warrior who fought to win once fighting became necessary has been a recurring theme of US foreign policy, Matthews says. It began with George Washington whose shrewd realism has informed our nation's diplomacy and use of force through most of our history. (For more on the major strains of thought in our country's foreign policy through the years, see my post, Foreign Policy Over Burritos and Tacos.)
The US departed significantly from this approach to foreign and military policy in Vietnam. In it, the country might be described as an intrusive warrior, yet one who did not fight to win.
After the death of 241 Marines in Beirut during the Reagan Administration, General Colin Powell was charged with creating and enunciating a clear policy to guide the application of US military force. The "Powell Doctrine," suggests Matthews, was nothing other than the policy of George Washington and Rick Blaine. As summarized by Matthews, the Powell Doctrine held that:
War...should be a last resort. It should be undertaken only in the presence of precise political and military goals with clear popular support from the American public and the Congress. There must be a clear exit strategy and unhesitating will to deploy overwhelming force.Matthews feels that US policy underwent dangerous mission creep after the attacks of September 11, 2001. He says that a policy initially aimed at creating a narrowly-focused campaign to eradicate the Al Qaeda terrorist network became a generalized war on "any international terrorist group" and then on what President Bush called "the axis of evil": North Korea, Iran, and Iraq. Later, Libya, Syria, Cuba, Sudan, and Somalia were added to the list. Ultimately, the President announced in 2002, that the US would campaign against tyrants anywhere in the world and feel free to use preemptive action to do so. (The President underscored this policy in his Inaugural Address.)
The Powell Doctrine reconciled America's new status as the lone superpower with its reluctant -warrior past.
President Bush, Matthews worries, has adopted a kind of Wilsonian foreign policy, one that includes the notion of spreading democracy at the end of a bayonet and engaging in preemptive war.
Matthews concludes this rather grim chapter with these words:
Myself, I worry that this change in course threatens us with dangerous consequences. Will America still be guided by its role as a reluctant warrior in this new century? Or will the reality of America's colossal military power overwhelm the fine instincts of its history?
What do you think?
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